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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
of CORA E. FENNER.,

Case No. 8474

Deceased.

APPELLANT'S. BRIEF

STATEMENT OF· FACTS
Mrs. Cora E. Fenner was, at the time of her death
in an Ogden hospital on F'ebruary 10, 1952, beneficiary
of the proceeds of three life insurance policies taken out
on the life of her deceased husband, Walter E. Fenner.
These policies were written by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United ·states, hereinafter referred
to as "the Society." Each of these policies contained an
identical "Special Provision" which gave Mrs. F'enner
several choices as to the method of payment of the
amounts "held on deposit" for her (Exhibit 1, P. 4).
The Society accepted proof of the death of Walter E.
Fenner on the 28th day of December, 1951, and the 28th
of each month was thereafter treated as the "interest due
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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date" within the terms of payment on the policies. The
policies provided for payment of the "amount becoming
due" on "the amount held on deposit." (Exhibits 1, 2(b),
P. 4). Pursuant to this clause, the Society mailed to Cora
E. Fenner two checks, the first in the amount of $64.80
dated the 24th day of J anua.ry, 1952, as payment for
interest due on the amounts held on deposit with the
Society as proceeds of the three policies from the date
of the decedent's death, November 19, 1951, to the first
interest due date, December 28th, 1951; the second check
for $5'2.65 dated January 28, 1952, was payment for the
interest due on the deposits from December 28, 1951 to
J anua.ry 28, 1952. No demand was ever made for payment and the checks representing the amount due on the
amounts held on deposit were sent to her as of course.
On January 2nd, 1952, Cora E. F'enner withdrew the
sums held on deposit with the Society under two other
policies identical except as to the amounts. Inheritance
tax was paid on these sums without protest. (Except
where otherwise designated, the State of Fiacts supra
is taken from the Stipulation of the parties which was
entered into the Record on Appeal by Order of this
Court on the lOth day of October, 1953.)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The position of the Utah State Tax Commission is
that Mrs. F·enner clearly had the absolute use of and
title to the amounts "held on deposit" which were "due"
(Ex. 1, P. 4, 6) and "payable" (Ex. 1, P. 3) and the mere
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fact that she chose not to withdraw the sums and consuine them for her own objects, but rather elected to
have the sums paid over upon her death to the named
nieces and nephews, (who received the same proportionate share either under her will or as contingent beneficiaries under the policies [Stipulation, Par. 8 and
Exhibit Two]), should not affect her duty to pay the tax
due on all property which she owned. We contend that
1\irs. Cora E. Fenner was the owner of the proceeds with
no restriction on the use thereof, and that these proceeds
should have been included in the inventory as part of
her gross estate.

POINT I.
MRS. CORA E. FENNER WAS AT THE TIME OF HER
DEATH OWNER IN FEE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THREE
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES WHICH SHOULD HAVE
BEEN INVENTORIED WITH HER OTHER ASSETS AS
PART OF HER GROSS ESTATE, AS PROVIDED IN TITLE
59-12-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953).
(A) WHETHER THE ESTATE CREATED IN MRS.
CORA E. FENNER IS DEEMED BY THIS COURT A FEE
SIMPLE ABSOLUTE WITH VOID REMAINDER OVER, OR
A FEE SIMPLE DEFEASIBLE, SUCH ESTATE IS WITHIN
THE PURVIEW OF OUR INHERITANCE TAX STATUTE.

Any litigation involving estates gives rise to the
problems of semantics. The Minute Entry of the District
Court does not set forth the grounds for the exclusion
from the inventory of the amounts held on deposit by
the Society. Thus the task falls to this Court to append
a legal label to the estate created by the insurance conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tract, which is set forth in full in the Record on Appeal.
The Commission submits, however, that whichever of the
possible and plausible labels chosen, the particular
interest or estate created upon the death of Walter E.
Fenner falls within the purview of our inheritance tax
statute.
Our Utah statute setting forth the property to be
included in the evaluation of a decedent's gross estate
reads:

59-12-3.
"Gross estate, how determined-Election by
executor.-The value of the gross estate of a
decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death, or as of a time nine
months after his death whichever the executor
within ten months after such death elects by filing
an election with the clerk of the district court and
the tax commission, of all properly, real or personal, within the jurisdiction of this state, and
any interest therein, whe:ther tangible or intangible, which shall pass to any person, in trust or
otherwise, by testamentary disposition or by law
of inheritance or succession of this or any other
state or country, or by deed, grant, bargain, sale
or gift made in contemplation of the death of the
grantor, vendor or donor, or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death. Provided, (1) property included in the
gross estate on the date of death and, within nine
months after the decedent's death, distributed by
the executor or sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, shall be included at its value as of the
time of such distribution, sale, exchange, or other
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disposition, whichever first occurs, instead of its
value as of the date nine months after the decedent's death, and (2) any interest or estate which
is affected by mere lapse of time shall be included
at its value as of the time of death (instead of the
later date), with adjustment for any difference in
its value as of the later date not due to mere lapse
of time. No deduction under this title of any
item shall be allowed if allowance for such item
is in effect given by the valuation under this subdivision. Wherever in any other section of this
chapter reference is made to the value of property at the time of the decedent's death, such
reference shall be deemed to refer to the value
of such property used in determining the value
of the gross estate." (Emphasis added)
There can be no dispute that the legislature intended
to include all legal estates in realty and personalty which
were not otherwise exempt. It would also seem abundantly clear that the interest of Mrs. F'enner, however
characterized, was within the provisions of this statute.
The insurance contract may have created in the
beneficiary either (a) a title in fee simple; or (b) a title
in fee simple defeasible. The Restatement of Property
defines an Estate in Fee Simple as one which,
"(a)
(i)

has a duration
potentially infinite; or

( ii) terminable upon an event which is certain to occur but is not certain to occur within a
fixed or computable period of time or within the
duration of any specified life or lives; or
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(iii) terminable upon an event which is certain to occur, provided such estate is one left in
the conveyor, subject to defeat upon the occurrence of the stated event in favor of a person
otherthantheconveyor;and
·(b) if limited in favor of a natural person,
would be inheritable by his collateral as well as
by his lineal heirs." (A.L.I. Restatement of Property, ·sec. 14.)
The interest Mrs. Fenner took falls within this
definition, although it may be argued that her failure
to designate one of the optional modes of payment
amounted to a failure to perfect her fee. Clearly, had
she made the positive move of withdrawing the amounts
held on deposit, her estate would be required to account
therefor. By their conduct in paying without protest
inheritance tax on the two other identical policies, the
proceeds of which were consumed by Mrs. F·enner, counsel thus admit this point. The distinction then between a
fee absolute and the interest Mrs. Fenner took is the
artificial one that she omitted to notify the Society of
her desires to withdraw the funds "held on deposit."
She had all of the perquisites of a fee holder, viz.,
she had the right and power to sell or assign her interest
or spend the amount on deposit at any time with no
restrictions.

(The administrative limitation requiring

her to give notice of withdrawal prior to an interest due
date is not material here.) In addition, the interest
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accruing on the amounts "held on deposit" was paid to
her as a rna tter of course.
An equally tenable construction would be that the
interest which Mrs. Fenner took was an estate in Fee
Simple Defeasible. The Restatement of Property defines
such an interest as :
"An estate in fee simple which is subject to
a special limitation, a condition subsequent, an
executory limitation, or a combination of such
restrictions." (A.L.I. Restatement of Property,
Sec. 16.)
Notwithstanding the intent of the husband, Walter
E. F·enner, to create a given interest, if the grant to his
widow was - as we_ submit is the case - absolute, any
subsequent attempted' grant of a contingent remainder
to the named nieces and nephews must be treated as a
nullity and void. (Inheritance and Estate Taxes, Pinkerton and Millsaps, Sec. 17 4, p·. 139 (1952).)
S.UMMARY
Thus, this court may construe the interest created
in Mrs. Cora E. F·enner as either a Fee Simple Absolute
with a void remainder over or as a Fee Simple Defeasible
-defeasible upon her failure to withdraw, assign, consume or otherwise dispose of the principal held on
deposit. Upon either hypothesis our statute (Title 59-123, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) encompasses within its
terms the particular estate created.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
(B) OUR INHERITANCE TAX STATUTE IS TO BE
CONSTRUED SO AS TO BE "FAIR AND REASONABLE"
AND ANY CONSTRUCTION WHICH EXCLUDES SUCH
INTERESTS AS THOSE OF THE DECEDENT IN THE PROCEEDS O·F THESE POLICIES WOULD RENDER PARTS OF
THE STATUTE NUGATORY AND, HENCE, WOULD BE
NEITHER FAIR NOR REASONABLE.

The statute which must be construed in the determination of this case (Title 59-12-3, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) reads, in part:
"The value of the gross estate of a decedent
shall be determined by including * * * all property real or personal * * * or any interest thereirn,
whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass
to any person in trust or otherwise * * * intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death." (Emphasis added)
To exclude the interest Mrs. F'enner took as beneficiary of the three policies would be to ignore, for example, such phrases as "any interest" and "tangible or
intangible."
The Supreme Court of this state held in the case of
In re Osgood's Estate, (52 Utah 185 at 195, 173 Pac. 152
(1918) ) , that :
"While w~ are aware of and approve the
geperal rule that a law which imposes a tax of any
kind or character cannot be extended by construction beyond the literal terms of the statute * * *
At all events the inheritance tax statute of this
state should receive a fair and reasonable· construction both in favor of the state and against
1•t"
•
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See Also, Norville vs. Sta.te Ta.x Commission, 98
U t. 170, 97 P 2d 937 ( 1940) ; and Sutherlan,d,
Infra, Sec. 6703 and 6710.
"It is the policy of the law to insure the collection of all taxes and whenever it is possible on
any theory to do so, the courts will construe the
statutes to accomplish that result." Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, (3rd Ed.) Vol. 3, Sec.
6706, p. 302 and cases cited thereat.
(C) THE LANGUAGE OF THE POLICIES CLEARLY
INDICATES THAT MRS. CORA E. FENNER TOOK TITLE
IN FEE TO THE PROCEEDS OF THE POLICIES.

One of the more compelling reasons sustaining the
commission's position that the interest created in ~Irs.
Fenner is includable in her gross estate is sin1ply that
the unambiguous language of the insurance contract
itself so establishes. Throughout the policy and its
several addenda the proceeds are referred to as being
"due" (Exhibit one, p. 4, par. 2 and 2 (b) ; p. 6), "payable" (Exhibit one, p. 3), "held on deposit" (Exhibit One,
p. 4, par. 2 (b)), and "left on deposit" (Exhibit One, p.
4, par. 2; p. 6, par. 1). Such phrases are inconsistent with
any other conclusion than that Mrs. F·enner was absolute
owner of the proceeds.
Perhaps the most explicit statement establishing title
in Mrs. Fenner is found in Exhibit One, p. 3, which reads:
"This policy having matured by the death
of the insured, the net proceeds, to-wit: TEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIR.TY ONE
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and 92/100 DOLLARS ($10,351.92) ha,ve become
p·ayable as provided in the policy." (Emphasis
Added).
It has been held by many courts that the word "Due"
means owing and immediately payable, i.e., that the person to whom something is "Due" is the owner of the
property and has ti tie to the res.
See e.g., Barnk of America Nat. Trust and Sav.
Ass'n. v. Gillett, 36 Cal. App. 2d 453, 97 P. 2d
875 (1940); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Greiner, 115 Mich. 639, 74 N.W. 187 (1898).
"Due means having reached the date at which
payment is required; payable; said especially of
a note or obligation in which the time for payment
is specified." Syl. 5, 56 Ariz. 247, 107 P. 2d 212
(1940).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Tax Commission submits that our
Utah inheritance tax statute by its express terms covers
the estate granted to Mrs. F·enner-however that estate
may be characterized by this Court. The intended coverage and scope of the statute- as drawn from the plain
meaning of the words themselves - compels the inclusion of such an estate within the inventory of a decedent's
gross assets. Furthermore, the insurance contract itself
in using language as "due" "payable" and "held on
deposit", seems clearly to create an interest in the
deposited sums akin to an ordinary bank deposit. Indeed,
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banks often require notice of withdrawal as a condition
to the maintenance of such accounts-much as was provided for in the policies in issue.
It is submitted, therefore, that Mrs. F·enner was the
owner of the proceeds of the life insurance policies on
the life of her husband, Walter E. Fenner, and the District Court erred in failing to order their inclusion within
the inventory of Mrs. F:enner's gross estate.

C. PRE·STON ALLEN,
ADAM M. DUNCAN,

Attovrneys for .Apvellant,
Utah State Tax Commission
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